The Relation of Ignorance , Opinion and Knowledge to Duty .sx Some remarks I published not long ago about Morals were criticized on the ground that I had assumed without discussion that what was right to do was unaffected by what was thought right .sx I therefore set out to consider , in greater detail , in what ways , if any , what is right is affected by what is thought right .sx I first considered whether what is right for me to do on a given occasion can be affected by what other people think right .sx I do not intend to trouble you with the results of that consideration .sx I came to the conclusion , perhaps wrongly , but to myself pretty clearly , that though what is right for me to do on a given occasion may depend very much upon what other people think about other things , it can never depend upon what they think right for me to do on that occasion .sx What I propose to trouble you with is the much more interesting and difficult question in what ways , if any , can what is right for me to do on a given occasion be affected by what I myself think , and in particular by what I think right .sx Let me say I am not proposing to investigate the ultimate character of obligation .sx I am engaged in the less ambitious task of what is called " discovering a formula .sx " Can we agree on any description .sx of the apparent facts of moral judgment which will save us from confusion when we try to carry our enquiry deeper ?sx I have not found any formula very satisfactory .sx I put my suggestions before you in the hope that you can improve upon them .sx I will try to state as shortly as I can the difficulties which I want to meet .sx They consist in apparently contradictory things which we say about what is right or wrong for a man to do .sx We speak on the one hand of not knowing what is right , of trying to find out what is right , of people mistakenly thinking something right , and afterwards finding out their mistake .sx All this language quite clearly implies that what is right is not affected by what the agent thinks right ; may , indeed , be the very contrary of it .sx On the other hand , we also say things which seem to imply that the belief or ignorance of the agent may affect not only his morality or immorality ( that is , I assume , not contested ) , but the actual rightness or wrongness of what he does .sx And it sometimes looks as if the belief or ignorance which thus alters the rightness or wrongness of what he does is belief or ignorance precisely about the rightness or wrongness of his action .sx ( a ) We say animals and infants cannot do right or wrong .sx The cat does not do right in defending its young or wrong in eating them or in torturing a mouse .sx If we are asked why these things which would be right or wrong in a man are not right or wrong in a cat , we are apt to say " because the cat does not know they are right or wrong .sx " And we should say the same about infants .sx Yet if a man does not know that a type of action is wrong we still say he is doing wrong in doing such actions , though we may not blame him or call his action immoral .sx I suppose 1 itsimply does not occur to some savages that it is wrong to kill or torture their prisoners .sx I suppose some inquisitors have been convinced it was right to torture heretics .sx We say without hesitation that they are mistaken , their acts are really wrong , we should try to convert them and also to prevent them forcibly .sx Our first attempt to explain this contradiction is by saying that the animal not only does not know the acts are right or wrong , but is incapable of knowing it .sx But the savage also is incapable of knowing it now ; he might require a long education for which he is too old .sx And , on the other hand , the infant is capable , with time , of knowing it , yet we speak of him as of the animal .sx I can only suggest here that the savage knows some things are right and wrong .sx He is , therefore , unlike the infant or animal , capable of action in the strict sense which involves freedom of choice .sx And as rightness is a character of action only , it cannot be a character of the proceedings of animals and infants .sx Among the things which the savage knows to be right is to find out what other things are right .sx He shows this by enquiring of oracles , scruples about impurity , &c .sx So we could begin his education at once .sx With the infant we must wait .sx With the animal it is no good waiting .sx Right and wrong then , I suppose , only apply to the actions of rational beings .sx But so far the rightness or wrongness of an action seems independent of whether the agent is aware of the rightness or wrongness or not .sx Savages and inquisitors do act wrongly .sx So far we have discussed what Aristotle would , I think , call ignorance of the universal , but what I should prefer to call moral ignorance .sx ( b ) Let us now turn to what Aristotle would call ignorance .sx of the particular , but what I should prefer to call ignorance of matters of physical fact .sx Oedipus knew it was wrong to kill a father but did not know this man was his father .sx Surgeons know it is wrong to inflict unnecessary pain , but at one time did not know there were anaesthetics .sx I may know it is wrong not to pay my debts , but may have quite forgotten that I own this man money .sx Neither Oedipus nor the old surgeons nor I act immorally , that is agreed on all hands .sx But must we say that all act wrongly ?sx It seems very harsh , especially in the case of the surgeons .sx And if Oedipus and I were not careless , it seems harsh in our cases too .sx What is right or wrong depends wholly on the situation ; and ignorance of anaesthetics , or forgetfulness of debt may be a relevant fact in the situation .sx Yet can ignorance of the situation be a part of the situation ?sx Again , it cannot surely be wrong to do what it is impossible to avoid , but how is it possible for me to use anaesthetics if I do not know of them ?sx Is it really possible for me to pay a debt if I do not know of it ?sx Was it , then , wrong to inflict pain which the surgeons knew no way of avoiding ?sx Nobody thinks that I do wrong if I fail to save a man's life because I do not know how to swim , or because I do not know he is in the water .sx Why , then , should they think I do wrong in failing to cure him because I do not know the right drug or in failing to pay a debt because I do not know this man is my creditor ?sx I have tried to remove these contradictions by adopting a formula which is certainly open to very serious objections , but which does seem to me to help , and which I should like to have criticized and improved .sx I suggested to myself that the " action " to which the characters of rightness and wrongness belong is not , as it is often said tobe , the bringing about of a certain change , but always the trying to bring about a certain change .sx It is not right for me to stop a man's pain , or abstain from killing my father , or to pay my debts .sx All these things may be impossible , either through physical incapacity or through ignorance about persons or things or events .sx So we cannot say I ought to do them .sx But I ought to try to do them , it is right for me to try to do them , and wrong not to try .sx Trying to effect a change of a certain kind includes both the mental effort to discover means or ways of effecting it and the physical effort to initiate those means .sx Trying in both these senses is always possible .sx So if trying were the only thing that is right , the only thing I ought to do , then there would be nothing right , or which I ought to do , that would be rendered impossible for me to do either through physical incapacity or by ignorance of physical fact .sx But there still would be things right for me to do ( e.g. , trying to spare captured enemies unnecessary pain ) which would , in a sense , be impossible for me to do through moral ignorance ; because I might neither know them to be right nor desire to do them .sx And it is not possible to do anything except for one of these reasons .sx Still , I feel there must be some truth in these natural distinctions .sx The surgeons , ignorant of anaesthetics , were not acting wrongly in inflicting pain .sx The savage , ignorant of the wrongness of torturing enemies , is acting wrongly in torturing them .sx The infant , the lunatic , the cat , are not acting wrongly in inflicting pain ( even though they know they are inflicting pain and could be stopped by fear ) because they are not rational and so are incapable of acting .sx The usual objection to the formula that what is right or wrong .sx is always the trying to effect a certain change is this :sx that it only passes judgment on part of the change we actually do bring about , and indeed only on part of the change we believe we are bringing about .sx Now , so far as it refuses to judge changes which we are bringing about but do not know we are bringing about , I am at present inclined to say that it is correct in so refusing .sx My trying to cure a man may be right , even though the dose by which I try to cure actually kills him , or though he lives to murder .sx A more serious objection is that the formula leaves out of consideration changes which I believe or know I am bringing about incidentally to that which I am trying to bring about .sx It does not judge my whole intention .sx On this formula , it is alleged , the inquisitor would be acting rightly by trying to save the heretic's soul ; we could not say he is acting wrongly in inflicting pain , for he is not trying to do so , he merely thinks he must as a means to the other .sx Of course he ought to try not to inflict pain , but the infliction of pain might be less wrong than letting a soul perish , and they might be alternatives .sx If surgeons acted rightly in trying to save a man's life , though they thought mistakenly this must be painful , so , it seems , did inquisitors .sx The dilemma is this .sx If we say the inquisitor acted wrongly in trying to save a man from infinitely greater pains by lesser ones , just because , in fact , he was not saving him from greater pains , then we must say a surgeon acts wrongly in trying to save a man from cancer by an operation without anaesthetics if anaesthetics have not been discovered .sx The action of bothseems right in the circumstances , i.e. , with the evidence available to the agent .sx I confess this is very unsatisfactory .sx Let me , in conclusion , try to collect some of the difficulties and contradictions of our moral judgments in an imaginary instance .sx Suppose that , in fact , I have liabilities to two men but have completely , forgotten both facts , through no fault of my own .sx Ought I to pay them ?sx I find it hard to say that if I spent my money otherwise I have done anything wrong .sx Yet one thing I know is that I ought to try to recollect my liabilities , and in doing this duty I may recollect my two debts , and then I clearly ought to try to pay them .sx But suppose in trying to pay them both I discover that it is impossible to pay both .sx