All that is needed is that , at some stage in the causal ancestry of A , there shall be a total cause which contains as factors desires of the agent answering to the conditions which I have stated .sx That is to say , all that is necessary is that A shall have a causal ancestor which is a causal progenitor , containing as a factor an incompletely deter-mined desire of the agent's .sx We come now to the final question .sx Sup-posing that this negative condition were fulfilled , would this suffice to make an action categorically obligable ?sx It seems to me plain that it would not .sx Unless some further and positive condition were fulfilled , all that one could say would be the following :sx " The desire to do A happened to be present in me with such strength and persistence , as compared with the desire to do B , that I did A and avoided B. The desire to do B might have happened to be present in me with such strength and persistence , as compared with the desire to do A , that I should have done B and avoided " .sx Now , if this is all , the factthat I did A and not B is , in the strictest sense , an accident , lucky or unlucky as the case may be .sx It may be welcomed or it may be deplored , but neither I nor anything else in the universe can properly be praised or blamed for it .sx It begins to look as if the categorical ought may be inapplicable , though for different reasons , both on the hypothesis that voluntary actions have causal progenitors and on the hypothesis that none of their causal ancestors are causal progenitors .sx I.2222. THE POSITIVE CONDITION .sx Let us .sx now try to discover the positive conditions of categorical obligability .sx I think that we should naturally tend to answer the sort of objection which I have just raised in the following way .sx We should say :sx " I deliberately identified myself with my desire to do A , or I deliberately threw my weight on the side of that desire .sx I might instead have made no particular effort in one direction or the other ; or I might have identified myself with , and thrown my weight on the side of , my desire to do B. So my desire to do A did not just hap-pen to be present with the requisite strength .sx and persistence , as compared with my desire to do B. It had this degree of strength and persistence because , and only because , I reinforced it by a deliberate effort , which I need not have made at all and which I could have made in favour of my desire to do B Another way of expressing the same thing would be this I forced myself to do A ; but I need not have done so , and , if I had not done so , I should have done " .sx Or again :sx " I might have forced myself to do B ; but I did not , and so I did " .sx It is quite plain that these phrases express a genuine positive experience with which we are all perfectly familiar .sx They are all , of course , metaphorical .sx It will be noticed that they all attempt to describe the generic fact by metaphors drawn from specific instances of it , e.g. , deliberately pressing down one scale of a balance , deliberately joining one side in a tug-of-war , deliberately thrusting a body in a certain direction against obstacles ; and so on .sx In this respect they may be compared with attempts to describe the generic facts about time and change by metaphors drawn from .sx specific instances , such as flowing streams , moving spots of light , and soon .sx The only use of such metaphors is to direct attention to the sort of fact which one wants one's hearers to contemplate .sx They give no help towards analysing or comprehending this fact .sx A metaphor helps us to understand a fact only when it brings out an analogy with a fact of a different kind , which we already understand .sx When a generic fact can be described only by metaphors drawn from specific instances of itself it is a sign that the fact is unique and peculiar , like the fact of temporal succession and the change of events from futurity , through presentness , to pastness .sx Granted that there is this unique and peculiar factor of deliberate effort or reinforcement , how far does the recognition of it help us in our present problem ?sx So far as I can see , it merely takes the problem one step further back .sx My doing of A is completely deter-mined by a total cause which contains as factors my desire to do A and my desire to do B , each of which has a certain determinate strength and persistence .sx The preponderance .sx of my desire to do A over my desire to do B , in respect of strength and persistence , is completely determined by a total cause which contains as a factor my putting forth a certain amount of effort to reinforce my desire for A. This effort-factor is not completely deter-mined .sx It is logically consistent with all the nomic , occurrent , dispositional , and back-ground facts that no effort should have been made , or that it should have been directed towards reinforcing the desire for B instead of the desire for A , or that it should have been put forth more or less strongly than it actually was in favour of the desire for A. Surely then we can say no more than that it just happened to occur with a certain degree of intensity in favour of the desire for Ai .sx I think that the safest course at this stage for those who maintain that some actions are categorically obligable would be the following .sx They should admit quite frankly what I have just stated , and should then say :sx " How-ever paradoxical it may .sx seem , we do regard ourselves and other people as morally responsible for accidents of this unique kind , andwe do not regard them as morally responsible , in the categorical sense , for anything but such accidents and those consequences of them which would have been different if the accidents had happened differently .sx Only such accidents , and their causal descendants in the way of volition and action , are categorically " .sx If anyone should take up this position , I should not know how to refute him , though I should be strongly inclined to think him mistaken .sx This is not , however , the position which persons who hold that some actions are categorically obligable generally do take at this point .sx I do not find that they ever state quite clearly what they think they believe , and I suspect that this is because , if it were clearly stated , it would be seen to be impossible .sx I shall therefore try to state clearly what I think such people want to believe , and shall try to show that it is impossible .sx I suspect that they would quarrel with my statement that , on their view , the fact that one puts forth such and such an effort in support of a certain desire is , in the strictest sense , an accident .sx They would .sx like to say that the putting forth of a certain amount of effort in a certain direction at a certain time is completely determined , but is determined in a unique and peculiar way .sx It is literally determined by the agent or self ; considered as a substance or continuant , and not by a total cause which contains as factors events in and dispositions of the agent .sx If this could be maintained , our puttings-forth of effort would be completely determined , but their causes would neither be events nor contain events as cause-factors .sx Certain series of events would then originate from causal pro-genitors which are continuants and not events .sx Since the first event in such a series would be completely determined , it would not be an accident .sx And , since the total cause of such an event would not be an event and would not contain an event as a cause-factor , the two alternatives " completely determined " and " partially undetermined " would both be in-applicable to it .sx For these alternatives apply only to events .sx I am fairly sure that this is the kind of pro-position which people who profess to believe .sx in Free Will want to believe .sx I have , of course , stated it with a regrettable crudity , of which they would be incapable .sx Now it seems to me clear that such a view is impossible .sx The putting-forth of an effort of a certain intensity , in a certain direction , at a certain moment , for a certain duration , is quite clearly an event or process , however unique and peculiar it may be in other respects .sx It is therefore subject to any conditions which self-evidently apply to every event , as such .sx Now it is surely quite evident that , if the beginning of a certain process at a certain time is determined at all , its total cause must contain as an essential factor another event or process which enters into the moment from which the determined event or process issues .sx I see no prima facie objection to there being events that are not completely determined .sx But , in so far as an event is deter-mined , an essential factor in its total cause must be other events .sx How could an event possibly be determined to happen at a certain date if its total cause contained no factor to which the notion of date has any application ?sx And how can the notion of date have .sx any application to anything that is not an event ?sx Of course I am well aware that we constantly use phrases , describing causal transactions , in which a continuant is named as the cause and no event in that continuant is mentioned .sx Thus we say :sx " The stone broke the " , " The cat killed the " , and so on .sx But it is quite evident that all such phrases are elliptical .sx The first , e.g. , expresses what would be more fully expressed by the sentence :sx " The coming in contact of the moving stone with the window at a certain moment caused a process of disintegration to begin in the window at that " .sx Thus the fact that we use and understand such phrases casts no doubt on the general principle which I have just enunciated .sx Let us call the kind of causation which I have just described and rejected " non-occurrent causation of " .sx We will call the ordinary kind of causation , which I had in mind when I defined " Determinism " and " Indeterminism" , " occurrent " .sx Now I think we can plausibly suggest what .sx may have made some people think they believe that puttings-forth of effort are events which are determined by non-occurrent causation .sx It is quite usual to say that a man's putting-forth of effort in a certain direction on a certain occasion was determined by " Reason " or " Principle " or " Conscience " or " The Moral " .sx Now these impressive names and phrases certainly do not denote events or even substances .sx If they denote anything , they stand for propositions or systems of pro-positions , or for those peculiar universals or systems of universals which Plato called " Ideas " .sx If it were literally true that puttings-forth of effort are determined by such entities , we should have causation of events in time by timeless causes .sx But , of course , statements like " Smith's putting-forth of effort in a certain direction on a certain occasion was determined by the Moral Law " cannot be taken literally .sx The Moral Law , as such , has no causal efficacy .sx What is meant is that Smith's belief that a certain alternative would be in accordance with the Moral Law , and his desire to do what is right , were cause-factors .sx in the total cause which determined his putting-forth of effort on the side of that alternative .sx Now this belief was an event , which happened when he began to reflect on the alternatives and to consider them in the light of the moral principles which he accepts and regards as relevant .sx And this desire was an event , which happened when his conative-emotional moral dispositions were stirred by the process of reflecting on the alternatives .sx Thus the use of phrases about action being " determined by the Moral Law " may have made some people think they believe that some events are deter-mined by non-occurrent causation .sx