A DEFENCE OF THE TRUE FAITH .sx BY BROTHER ROBERTS .sx MR. Barnett reproduces the argument of personal identity amid atomic change .sx This is sufficiently answered on page 34 of Twelve Lectures .sx A remark or two , however , is called for here .sx He bases the argument on a fallacy to begin with .sx He says that during the change of a man's substance from waste and nutrition , " his personality undergoes no corresponding change .sx " This is not true .sx A man of forty feels himself a very different person from what he was at ten .sx An entire change in the nature of his consciousness takes place in the interval .sx It is a matter of universal experience , that as years roll by , the ideas change , the tastes change , the character changes , the voice changes , the personal physique changes- everything changes ; and the nature of these changes depends upon circumstances .sx Why ?sx Because the new material introduced into the system in the process of nutrition , is directed into new shapes and forms , according to the activities by which its absorption is guided and determined .sx If a man goes to sea , his muscles and vital organs , and the bony framework are in continual occupation , and the nutritive elements are consequently more largely made use of , in building up the mechanical parts of his being , than if he stayed at home .sx Send him to college , and you will see a different result .sx Activity of brain is brought into play , to the neglect of the bodily functions ; and the consequence is , the brain monopolises the nutritive supply , and is developed to the detriment of the merely physical powers , the result of which is , that the man is more feeble as a whole than his sea-faring brother , and has his mind very differently constituted from what it would have been had he been brought up at the plough .sx Mr. Barnett's assumption , therefore , that the personality undergoes no change with the progress of material substitution , is wrong .sx It undergoes many changes , but of course he feels himself the same individual , because the impressions originally constituting his individuality are perpetuated , though modified .sx But let a " stroke " affect the brain throughout , and obliterate original impressions ( of which there have been cases ) , the person's individuality vanishes .sx He forgets who he was , and what he knew , and begins the formation of a new individuality by means of new impressions , should his power to receive new impressions not have been destroyed by the calamity .sx A case of this sort is within the writer's experience , where there was a complete lapse of memory , necessitating the re-formation of acquaintance with friends , places , habits and everything .sx After a while , the second education as quickly disappeared as the first , and the old memories returned .sx On Mr. Barnett's theory , this was inexplicable .sx On the theory that the brain " thinks by virtue of its organization , " it is susceptible of explanation .sx Mr. Barnett denies the transmissibility of qualities .sx He feels himself compelled to do this , to save his argument on continuous identity ; but in yielding to theoretical exigency , he convicts himself of either ignorance or recklessness .sx The very argument he relies upon disproves his denial .sx He says the body " changes throughout several times in a man's life , and at seventy does not contain a single particle of the matter which composed it at seven .sx " Now , in view of this , how does Mr. Barnett deal with the fact that a person of dark complexion , eating the same food as a person of light complexion , will be dark complexioned till death ?sx Take the colour of the eye and the colour of the hair ; how does he account for the permanence of these organic qualities , except that the original quality is taken up by the succeeding atoms of nutrition ?sx Mr. Barnett's answer is " they assume similar qualities of their own .sx " Do they pick up nothing from their predecessors ?sx If they do not , how is it that the same flour and mutton eaten at the same table will turn to four different conditions as regards colour and organic quality , in four different persons ?sx Is it not the existing organism that determines the use and quality of the new material introduced ?sx and how could this be , except on the principle of transmission of quality ?sx Mr. Barnett's answer to this , finally surrenders the whole case against himself .sx He says " they enter into the same relation to the laws of life as those which the old have quitted .sx " Precisely , and this applied to the brain , explains continuous identity amid atomic change .sx Whatever impressions or qualities result from the original organization of the brain , are inherited by the new material , taken up by them , transmitted to successors and so on 6ad infinitum .sx But destroy the brain altogether , and you destroy the process as much as you destroy the sight of the eye and the hearing of the ear .sx Mr. Barnett can " detect nothing but unintelligible nonsense " in the proposition that " mind is the product of the living brain , and personal identity the sum of its impressions .sx " His objection to it is that if mind be the product of the brain , it would be subject like the brain to the law of atomic change .sx And so it is , as Mr. Barnett will discover , if he reflects but a moment .sx Is it not a fact , that unless we renew our knowledge , the lapse of time will weaken and in the end destroy it ?sx Is there no such thing as " getting out of use , " and forgetting what one has learnt ?sx The very power of education lies in the fact that Mr. Barnett denies , viz .sx , that the mind is " subject to the law of atomic change , " and depends for the form of its development upon the forces brought to bear in its guidance .sx Mr. Barnett struggles in vain against the proposition that if the mind be immaterial , its functions ought to be unaffected by the condition of the body .sx He suggests that it is associated with the material elements of his being on the common basis of life , which unites and affinitises all parts .sx Animal and vegetable substances are amalgamated on this basis , and why not a third , argues Mr. Barnett- the immaterial and immortal ?sx The answer is , nothing is impossible ; but if this is the principle on which the mind is developed in the body , obviously the inversion of the principle must be fatal to it .sx If life gives , death must take away .sx When " the principle of life " is withdrawn , the " animal and vegetable " elements of man's being are destroyed , and any third element depending upon " the principle of life " for its basis , must perish also .sx Mr. Barnett's argument recoils upon himself .sx To evade the recoil , he dogmatises on " the principle of life .sx " He says life is not the result of organisation , but a principle that operates through organisation .sx Upon this , we have to ask if the life of a dog is not in the same category ?sx Mr. Barnett cannot exclude it .sx A dog is as much God's handiwork as a man .sx It depends upon the same laws of respiration and deglutition as those which govern human existence .sx The Bible says men and beasts are identical in the mode of life and death ( Eccles =3 .sx 19-20) .sx What then would Mr. Barnett do with his definition as applied to a dog ?sx " Life is not the result of organization :sx organization is the medium through which life is manifested .sx " Has the dog an immortal principle of life that was antecedent to its organization , and which only manifests itself through its doggish body ?sx If so , whose principle of life was it before the dog came ?sx Was it the dog's ?sx If Mr. Barnett will admit that the primitive life-power in all cases is God's , we might agree with him ; but in admitting this , he must abandon the idea that human lives are separate entities or " souls , " which may be disembodied and live as conscious beings still .sx All human life , and all beast and all insect life , are but inspirations from the eternal universal fountain of life , of which the God revealed to Israel is the focal centre and controller .sx But Mr. Barnett's Platonism , deeply tinctured with the spirit of Greek mythology , teaching the existence of so many separate independent immortal intelligences , prevents him from seeing this .sx He insists upon three separable compounds as constituting the unity of a human being .sx If he would define them , the argument might be made more serviceable .sx " Body , soul and spirit " are his words , quoting from Paul .sx We submit to Mr. Barnett that these words describe aspects of human existence only while a man is alive .sx This is shown by the fact that they were addressed to and spoken of living men , and that the three aspects expressed are only presented in life .sx Is there a " body " when man is dissolved in the grave ?sx Is there a " soul " to that body when all soul is evaporated ?sx Is there a spirit to it when it no longer exists to be animated by a spirit ?sx It would be curious to know what Mr. Barnett understands by " soul " as distinct from " spirit " and 6vice versa .sx From a common-sense point of view the matter is plain .sx A man in life presents three aspects cognisant to the understanding .sx There is ( 1 ) the body , which is the basis of ( 2 ) the life , which develops ( 3 ) the spirit , or mind .sx A dead man is a body simply ; an idiot is a body with soul or life ; a living man with full possession of mental faculties presents the combination of " body , soul , and spirit .sx " When death comes , it destroys this combination .sx The body returns to the dust , the life returns to God , and the spirit disappears .sx The resurrection will put all three together again on the glorious basis of incorruptibility .sx MR. BARNETT'S REVIEW OF SCRIPTURE ARGUMENTS ON MORTALITY .sx MR. Barnett next attempts to follow the scriptural argument .sx He begins by observing that " it is a waste of words to argue against the received doctrine of man's immortality , as if that doctrine implied that man is not mortal .sx " He illustrates his meaning by saying that the dead are dead in some respects and alive in others .sx If Mr. Barnett would define his terms , it would be easier to follow him .sx What does he mean by " death ?sx " Has it no inverse reference to " life ?sx " Do we not derive our idea of death from acquaintance with life .sx Life is a positive phenomenon , and ( in relation to us ) has a beginning ; and the word " death " has become current to express the cessation of that phenomenon , with which , unfortunately , we are familiar .sx It is true the word is used with reference to a variety of things , but this only arises from the fact that there is a variety of life .sx Vegetable life gives rise to its use when a plant dies .sx Metaphorical life , as the prosperity of an institution , occasions its use , when prosperity departs and the institution dies .sx To whatever thing it applies , it expresses the opposite of the life pertaining to it , or that may be conceived as pertaining to it .sx On this obvious and universal principle , the death of a human being must have inverse reference to the life of a human being .sx It cannot be said that a human being is dead , unless his life as a human being has ceased .sx It is vain , therefore , for Mr. Barnett to get away from the inconsistency of a man being dead and alive at the same time .sx If a human being continues to live after death , he is not dead .sx It would not suit the theory to say that the body is dead , because according to the theory the body is never alive , but only inhabited by the real invisible man , on whose withdrawal the body crumbles .sx Mr. Barnett contends for the " elasticity " of the terms " life " and " death .sx " Unfortunately , he does not define what he means .sx The only elasticity about them is that already indicated , viz .sx , their applications to different kinds of life and death .sx On this principle , the Scriptures quoted by Mr. Barnett are perfectly intelligible without involving that violation of first principles on the subject which he wishes to found upon them .sx