In  other  words  , he  has  no  adequate  basis  on  which  to  
determine  whether  , in  consequence  of  the  deviance  he  refers  to  , 
there  was  , or  was  not  , a  stronger  definition  of  the  moral  and  
social  boundaries  of  the  community .sx   So  far  as  popular  perceptions  
and  evaluations  are  concerned  , he  is  without  means  of  access .sx   
  Likewise  , in  treating  the  second  hypothesis  , on  the  constant  
level  of  deviance  , Erikson  has  to  rely  on  official  crime  
statistics  , which  , for  well-known  reasons  , give  only  a  very  
uncertain  indication  of  the  actual  level  of  social  deviance  , and  
are  influenced  in  their  trend  by  a  variety  of  other  factors .sx   
However  , unlike  the  sociologist  of  deviance  working  in  contemporary  
society  , Erikson  cannot  investigate  in  any  detail  the  processes  
through  which  the  official  statistics  were  constituted  , nor  can  he  
collect  data  of  his  own  which  could  provide  alternative  estimates  -  
as  , say  , through  some  form  of  'victim  survey' .sx   
  To  be  sure  , the  hypotheses  that  Erikson  addresses  are  not  ones  
that  would  be  easily  tested  under  any  circumstances .sx   But  , given  
that  they  derive  from  a  theory  that  pretends  to  a  very  high  level  
of  generality  , there  is  all  the  more  reason  to  ask  why  Erikson  
should  impose  upon  himself  the  limitations  that  must  follow  from  
choosing  a  historical  case .sx   Why  should  he  deny  himself  the  
possibility  of  being  able  to  generate  his  own  evidence  , to  his  own  
design  , and  under  conditions  in  which  problems  of  reliability  and  
validity  could  best  be  grappled  with ?sx   Any  sociologist  , I  would  
maintain  , who  is  concerned  with  a  theory  that  can  be  tested  in  
the  present  should  so  test  it  , in  the  first  place  ; for  it  is  , in  
all  probability  , in  this  way  that  it  can  be  tested  most  
rigorously .sx   
  I  would  now  like  to  move  on  to  consider  cases  where  the  
recourse  of  sociologists  to  history  would  appear  to  have  the  
good  reasons  which  , I  earlier  maintained  , should  always  be  present .sx   
Here  my  aim  is  to  illustrate  what  such  reasons  might  be  , but  also  -  
when  they  are  acted  upon  -  the  difficulties  that  may  be  
expected .sx   
  Sociologists  , one  might  think  , will  most  obviously  need  to  turn  
to  history  where  their  interests  lie  in  social  change .sx   However  , it  
should  be  kept  in  mind  that  a  recourse  to  the  past  -  or  , that  is  , 
to  the  relics  thereof  -  is  not  the  only  means  through  which  such  
interests  may  be  pursued :sx   life-course  , cohort  or  panel  studies  , for  
example  , are  all  ways  of  studying  social  change  on  the  basis  of  
evidence  that  is  , or  has  been  , collected  in  the  present .sx   
Sociologists  , I  would  argue  , are  compelled  into  historical  research  
only  where  their  concern  is  with  social  change  that  is  in  fact  
historically  defined :sx   that  is  , with  change  not  over  some  
analytically  specified  length  of  time  -  such  as  , say  , 'the  
life-cycle'  or  'two  generations'  -  but  with  change  over  a  period  of  
past  time  that  has  dates  ( even  if  not  very  precise  ones  ) and  that  
is  related  to  a  particular  place .sx   Sociologists  have  a  legitimate  , 
and  necessary  , concern  with  such  historically  defined  social  change  
because  , as  I  have  earlier  suggested  , they  wish  to  know  how  widely  
over  time  and  space  their  theories  and  hypotheses  might  apply .sx   
  One  illustration  of  what  I  have  in  mind  here  is  provided  by  
Michael  Anderson's  book  , Family  Structure  in  Nineteenth  
Century  Lancashire   .sx   Anderson  is  concerned  with  the  hypothesis  
that  in  the  process  of  industrialisation  , pre-existing  forms  of  
'extended'  family  and  kinship  relations  are  disrupted .sx   
Specifically  , he  is  interested  in  whether  or  not  this  hypothesis  
holds  good  in  the  British  case  -  that  of  the  'first  industrial  
nation' .sx   Thus  , to  pursue  this  issue  , Anderson  aims  to  examine  just  
what  was  happening  to  kinship  relations  in  Britain  at  the  time  
when  , and  in  the  place  where  , the  'take-off'  into  industrialism  is  
classically  located .sx   In  contrast  , then  , with  Erikson  , Anderson  has  
a  quite  clear  rationale  for  turning  to  historical  research .sx   
  A  second  illustration  is  provided  by  Gordon  Marshall's  book  , 
  Presbyteries  and  Profits   .sx   Marshall  is  concerned  with  the  
'Weber  thesis'  -  that  a  connection  exists  between  the  secular  ethic  
of  ascetic  Protestantism  and  'the  spirit  of  capitalism' .sx   In  the  
long-standing  debate  on  this  thesis  , the  case  of  Scotland  has  
several  times  been  suggested  as  a  critical  one  , in  that  , in  the  
early  modern  period  , Scotland  had  a  great  deal  of  ascetic  
Protestantism  -  that  is  , Calvinism  -  yet  showed  little  in  the  way  
of  capitalist  development .sx   Marshall's  aim  is  then  to  re-examine  the  
Scottish  case  for  the  period  from  around  1560  down  to  the  Act  of  
Union  of  1707 .sx   Marshall  points  out  that  Weber  himself  always  
emphasised  that  his  argument  on  the  role  of  the  Protestant  ethic  in  
the  emergence  of  modern  capitalism  was  intended  to  apply  only  
to  the  early  stages  of  this  process :sx   once  a  predominantly  
capitalist  economy  was  established  , its  own  exigencies  -  in  the  
workplace  and  market  -  would  themselves  compel  behaviour  generally  
consistent  with  the  'spirit  of  capitalism'  without  need  of  help  
from  religion .sx   Again  , then  , Marshall  , like  Anderson  , has  obviously  
good  grounds  for  his  recourse  to  history .sx   
  Now  before  proceeding  further  , I  should  make  it  clear  that  I  
have  the  highest  regard  for  the  two  studies  to  which  I  have  just  
referred .sx   Both  make  signal  contributions  to  the  questions  they  
address  ; and  , for  me  , they  stand  as  leading  examples  of  how  in  fact  
historical  sociology  should  be  conceived  and  conducted .sx   I  say  this  
because  I  want  now  to  go  on  to  emphasise  the  severe  limitations  to  
which  the  analyses  of  both  authors  are  subject :sx   not  because  of  
their  deficiencies  as  sociologists  , but  simply  because  of  the  fact  
that  they  were  forced  into  using  historical  evidence  -  forced  into  
a  reliance  on  relics  -  rather  than  being  able  to  generate  their  own  
evidence  within  a  contemporary  society .sx   
  The  relics  on  which  Anderson  chiefly  relies  are  the  original  
enumerator's  books  for  the  censuses  of  1841  , 1851  and  1861 .sx   On  this  
basis  , he  can  reconstruct  household  composition  according  to  age  , 
sex  and  kinship  relations  , and  he  can  also  to  some  extent  examine  
the  residential  propinquity  of  kin .sx   But  this  still  leaves  him  a  
long  way  short  of  adequate  evidence  on  the  part  actually  played  by  
kinship  in  the  lives  of  the  people  he  is  studying  and  on  the  
meanings  of  kinship  for  them .sx   He  attempts  to  fill  out  the  
essentially  demographic  data  that  he  has  from  the  enumerators'  
books  by  material  from  contemporary  accounts .sx   But  these  would  , I  
fear  , have  at  best  to  be  categorised  as  'casual  empiricism'  and  at  
worst  as  local  gossip  or  travellers'  tales .sx   Titles  such  as  
  Walks  in  South  Lancashire  and  on  its  Borders  , A  Visit  to  
Lancashire  in  December  1862  ,  and  Lancashire  Sketches  
give  the  flavour .sx   
  Anderson  is  in  fact  entirely  frank  about  the  problem  he  faces .sx   
  " It  must  of  course  be  stressed  "  ,  he  writes  , 
  " that  just  because  interaction  with  kin  occurred  it  is  no  
necessary  indication  that  kinship  was  important .sx   The  real  test  , 
which  is  quite  impossible  in  any  precise  way  in  historical  work  , 
would  be  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  kinship  was  given  
preference  over  other  relational  contacts  ( and  the  reasons  for  this  
preference  ) , and  the  extent  to  which  contacts  with  kin  fulfilled  
functions  which  were  not  adequately  met  if  kin  did  not  provide  
them  "   .sx   
  The  point  I  want  to  make  here  would  perhaps  best  be  brought  out  
if  one  were  to  compare  Anderson's  study  of  kinship  with  one  carried  
out  in  contemporary  society  -  let  us  say  , for  example  , Claud  
Fischer's  study  of  kinship  and  of  other  'primary'  relations  in  
present-day  San  Francisco  , To  Dwell  Among  Friends   .sx   The  
only  conclusion  could  be  that  the  latter  is  greatly  superior  in  the  
range  and  quality  of  data  on  which  it  draws  , and  in  turn  the  rigour  
and  refinement  of  the  analyses  it  can  offer .sx   And  this  point  is  , of  
course  , not  that  Fischer  is  a  better  sociologist  than  Anderson  but  
that  he  has  an  enormous  advantage  over  Anderson  in  being  able  to  
generate  his  own  data  rather  than  having  to  rely  on  whatever  relics  
might  happen  to  be  extant .sx   
  Turning  to  Marshall  , one  finds  that  he  has  problems  essentially  
the  same  as  those  of  Anderson .sx   One  of  Marshall's  main  concerns  is  
that  Weber's  position  should  be  correctly  understood  -  following  
the  vulgarisations  of  Robertson  , Tawney  , Samuelson  and  other  
critics  ; and  in  this  respect  Marshall  makes  two  main  points .sx   First  , 
Weber  was  not  so  much  concerned  with  official  Calvinist  doctrine  on  
economic  activity  as  with  the  consequences  of  being  a  
believing  Calvinist  for  the  individual's  conduct  of  everyday  life  -  
consequences  which  the  individual  might  not  even  fully  realise .sx   In  
other  words  , Weber's  thesis  was  ultimately  not  about  theology  but  
subculture  and  psychology .sx   Secondly  , Weber's  argument  was  that  the  
Protestant  ethic  was  a  necessary  , but  not  a  sufficient  cause  of  the  
emergence  of  modern  capitalism  ; there  were  necessary  'material'  
factors  also  -  such  as  access  to  physical  resources  and  to  markets  , 
the  availability  of  capital  and  credit  etc.  
  Thus  , Marshall  argues  , in  evaluating  the  Weber  thesis  , it  is  
not  enough  to  look  simply  for  some  overt  association  between  
theology  , on  the  one  hand  , and  the  development  of  capitalist  
enterprise  on  the  other .sx   What  is  required  is  more  subtle .sx   It  is  
evidence  that  believing  Calvinists  , on  account  of  their  acceptance  
of  a  Calvinist  world-view  , were  distinctively  oriented  to  work  in  a  
regular  , disciplined  way  , to  pursue  economic  gain  rationally  , and  
to  accumulate  rather  than  to  consume  extravagantly  -  so  that  , 
  if  other  conditions  were  also  met  , capitalist  enterprise  
would  then  flourish .sx   
  Marshall's  position  here  is  , I  believe  , entirely  sound .sx   But  it  
leads  him  to  problems  of  evidence  that  he  can  in  fact  never  
satisfactorily  overcome  -  despite  his  diligence  in  searching  out  
new  sources  and  his  ingenuity  is  using  known  ones .sx   And  the  basic  
difficulty  is  that  relics  from  which  inferences  can  systematically  
be  made  about  the  orientations  to  work  and  to  money  of  early  modern  
Scots  are  very  few  and  far  between .sx   
  In  other  words  , what  is  crucially  lacking  -  just  as  it  was  
lacking  for  Anderson  and  indeed  for  Erikson  -  is  material  from  
which  inferences  might  be  made  , with  some  assurance  of  
representativeness  , about  the  patterns  of  social  action  
that  are  of  interest  within  particular  collectivities .sx   As  Clubb  has  
observed  , the  data  from  which  historians  work  only  rarely  allow  
access  to  the  subjective  orientations  of  actors  en  masse  ,  
and  inferences  made  in  this  respect  from  actual  behaviour  tend  
always  to  be  question-begging .sx   And  Marshall  , it  should  be  said  , 
like  Anderson  , sees  the  difficulty  clearly  enough .sx   He  acknowledges  
that  it  may  well  be  that  " the  kind  of  data  required  in  
order  to  establish  the  ethos  in  which  seventeenth-century  Scottish  
business  enterprises  were  run  simply  does  not  exist  "  -  or  , 
at  least  , not  in  sufficient  quantity  to  allow  one  to  test  
empirically  whether  Calvinism  did  indeed  have  the  effect  on  mundane  
conduct  that  Weber  ascribed  to  it .sx   
  III  
  Let  me  at  this  point  recapitulate .sx   I  have  argued  that  history  
and  sociology  differ  perhaps  most  consequentially  in  the  nature  of  
the  evidence  on  which  they  rely  , and  that  this  difference  has  major  
implications  for  the  use  of  history  in  sociology .sx   I  have  presented  
a  case  of  what  , from  this  standpoint  , must  be  seen  as  a  perverse  
recourse  to  history  on  the  part  of  a  sociologist  ; and  I  have  now  
discussed  two  further  cases  where  , in  contrast  , such  a  recourse  was  
justifiable  , indeed  necessary  , given  the  issues  addressed  , but  
where  , none  the  less  , serious  difficulties  arise  because  of  the  
inadequacy  of  the  relics  as  a  basis  for  treating  these  issues .sx   
  To  end  with  , however  , I  would  like  to  move  on  from  these  
instances  of  sociologists  resorting  to  history  in  the  pursuit  of  
quite  specific  problems  to  consider  -  with  my  initial  argument  
still  in  mind  -  a  whole  genre  of  sociology  which  is  in  fact  
  dependent  upon  history  in  its  very  conception   .sx   I  refer  
here  to  a  kind  of  historical  sociology  clearly  different  to  that  
represented  by  the  work  of  Anderson  or  Marshall  , and  which  has  two  
main  distinguishing  features .sx   First  , it  resorts  to  history  because  
it  addresses  very  large  themes  , which  typically  involve  the  tracing  
out  of  long-term  'developmental'  processes  or  patterns  or  the  
making  of  comparisons  across  a  wide  range  of  historical  societies  
or  even  civilisations .sx